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Summary. Hyperactivity is the most commonly diagnosed childhood psychiatric disorder in north
America. Most physicians believe that the disorder is a neurological dysfunction which is best
treated with stimulants, such as ritalin. Accounts of the history of hyperactivity written by physicians,
psychologists and even historians suggest that the disorder was always conceived as such. This paper
argues that, on the contrary, the notion that hyperactivity was a neurological condition only emerged
after vigorous debate during the 1960s between three competing ﬁelds within American psychiatry:
speciﬁcally psychoanalysis, social psychiatry and biological psychiatry. Biological psychiatry won the
debate, not because its approach to hyperactivity was more scientiﬁcally valid, but rather because its
explanations and methods ﬁt the prevailing social context more readily than that of its rivals.
American psychiatry’s refusal to draw pluralistic conclusions about hyperactivity undermined the
development of a deeper understanding of the disorder. The history of hyperactivity provides an
ideal lens through which to view the evolution of psychiatry from a ﬁeld dominated by Freudian
psychoanalysis to one rooted in the neurosciences.
Keywords: history of psychiatry; United States; childhood; hyperactivity; psychoanalysis; social
psychiatry; biological psychiatry; ADHD; mental health
A 2002 report by the American Center for Disease Control and Prevention announced
that at least 7 per cent of all elementary school children during 1997–8 had been
diagnosed with attention-deﬁcit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), or what has commonly
been known as hyperactivity.
1 Most psychiatrists currently believe that hyperactivity is
a neurological impairment characterised by not only hyperactive behaviour, but also
*Department of History, University of Exeter, Amory Building, Rennes Drive, Exeter EX4 4RJ, UK. E-mail:
ms302@ex.ac.uk
1The term ‘hyperactivity’ is used here instead of ADHD, partly because it is more historically relevant, but
also for simplicity’s sake. Although the disorder has been described using many terms during the past half
century (for example, hyperkinetic impulse disorder, hyperkinetic reaction, minimal brain dysfunction and
attention-deﬁcit disorder in the period 1957–80), hyperactivity has and continues to be the most widely
accepted term. Pastor and Reuben 2000, p. 3.
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Social History of Medicine Vol. 21, No. 3 pp. 541–559impulsivity, distractibility, deﬁance and aggression.
2 Psychiatrists suspect that hyperactiv-
ity is either caused by genetic neurological dysfunction, or less often, brain trauma.
Although psychiatrists and allied health professionals often suggest that the disorder
be treated with a combination of pharmacotherapy, cognitive-behaviour therapy and
family counselling, in the majority of cases, stimulant drugs such as ritalin (methylpheni-
date) are the core, if not the only, aspect of the treatment regimen.
Child psychiatry texts and hyperactivity primers often trace the history of hyperactivity
back to the early twentieth century, but a closer look at the medical literature reveals that
what most physicians today would identify as hyperactivity did not emerge until 1957,
when a pair of articles by Rhode Island psychiatrists Maurice Laufer and Eric Denhoff,
one of which was co-authored with Gerald Solomons, were published.
3 Described as
‘hyperkinetic impulse disorder’, the condition depicted bore all the hallmarks of what
is now recognised as hyperactivity.
4 More importantly, however, the cultural recognition
of hyperactivity as a disorder of epidemic proportions did not emerge until after the work
of Laufer and his colleagues, as geopolitical, demographic and educational changes
converged to provide a social environment in which the disorder they described could
be readily applied.
Despite the fact that the social and medical signiﬁcance of hyperactivity has prompted
a great deal of popular speculation about how the disorder should be treated, what
causes it and if it even exists, sociologists and, especially, historians have been reluctant
to explore its origins.
5 Two early exceptions are the books of Schrag and Divoky in 1975
and Conrad in 1976, both of which take a social constructivist approach to understand-
ing hyperactivity. While Schrag and Divoky stress the role of overt social control from
various levels of government in constructing the disorder, Conrad emphasises the more
inadvertent role of larger social forces during the 1960s, such as the advance of pharma-
ceutical technology and the growing interest in child mental health.
6 More recently,
Brancaccio has examined the early twentieth-century social and educational factors
that led to hyperactivity being recognised as pathological behaviour.
7 Brancaccio’s juxta-
position of hyperactivity’s emergence during this period and the rise of compulsory
schooling, however, overlooks evidence that hyperactivity research was extremely spora-
dic and that much of it, including the commonly cited work of Bradley in 1937, addressed
2Ingersoll 1998, pp. 1–22; Wender 2000, pp. 34–55.
3In the often-cited observations of Sir George Still in 1902, for example, hyperactive behaviour in children is
mentioned brieﬂy, only to be eclipsed by Still’s concerns about disturbing instances of violent behaviour
and self-harm in children. Other episodes cited as part of the history of hyperactivity, for example the
descriptions of post-encephalitic disorder during the 1920s and minimal brain damage during the
1940s and 1950s, differ from those after 1957 partly because of the stress on different symptoms, but
also because such disorders could be linked to a speciﬁc cause, namely brain trauma following infection
or injury. Nevertheless, as Adam Rafalovich has noted, what these episodes do highlight is the emerging
association of childhood behaviour problems and neurological dysfunction. Still 1902; Ebaugh 1923;
Strauss and Werner 1942; Rafalovich 2001, p. 107.
4Laufer and Denhoff 1957; Laufer et al. 1957.
5Many of the critiques of hyperactivity have been written by health care professionals. For example, Breggin
1998; Diller 1998; DeGrandpre 1999.
6Schrag and Divoky 1981, p. 38. Conrad 1976, p. 13.
7Brancaccio 2000, pp. 171–6.
542 Matthew Smithsmall numbers of institutionalised children, and not schoolchildren.
8 Other research has
been undertaken by sociologists, such as Singh, Rafalovich and Lakoff, and has contrib-
uted to the understanding of how people affected with hyperactivity conceptualise,
negotiate and cope with their diagnosis.
9
Although these scholars have outlined some aspects of the history of hyperactivity, one
is left with the impression that hyperactivity entered the medical scene during the 1970s
fully-formed as a neurological disorder best treated with stimulants.
10 This paper argues
that, instead, hyperactivity emerged as a neurological disorder only after vigorous debate
between three competing ﬁelds within psychiatry, speciﬁcally, psychoanalysis, social
psychiatry and biological psychiatry.
11 Proponents of biological psychiatry (who pointed
to neurological and genetic causes of hyperactivity), social psychiatry (who blamed
socio-economic deprivation) and psychoanalysis (whose explanations were rooted in
intra-family dynamics) competed with one another to produce an account of the disorder
that would eclipse that of the others. Biological psychiatry won the debate not so much
because its approach to hyperactivity was more scientiﬁcally valid, but rather because its
methods were less expensive, time-consuming and complicated than those of its rivals.
The refusal to collaborate or draw pluralistic conclusions about hyperactivity undermined
the development of a deeper understanding of the disorder, and left unanswered
questions about why it was thought to be such a serious problem and whether or not
it should be treated.
By describing the history of how American psychiatry came to conceptualise and treat
hyperactivity between 1957, when research into the disorder started in earnest, and
1980, when it was included in the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual (DSM-III), this paperalso tracesthe evolution ofpsychiatry,fromaﬁeld dominated
by Freudian psychoanalysis to one ﬁrmly entrenched in neurology.
12 The term ‘evolution’,
however, does not imply that biological psychiatry was somehow superior to psychoana-
lysis or social psychiatry. Rather, the biological psychiatry that emerged during the 1970s,
one of many mutations in psychiatry, best ﬁt the circumstances thrust upon it during that
period; as circumstances continue to change, so too will psychiatry.
13
8Bradley 1937.
9Lakoff 2000; Rafalovich 2001, 2004; Singh 2002, 2003, 2004; Mayes and Rafalovich 2007.
10Lakoff2000,pp.149–53;Singh2002,pp.584–8;Rafalovich2004,pp.21–34;MayesandRafalovich2007.
11These terms, although not representative of all psychiatrists researching hyperactivity, do reﬂect the most
common classiﬁcations found in contemporary psychiatric literature. Historians of psychiatry who have
examined this period have also used these terms to describe such divisions in psychiatry. For example,
Grob 1991, pp. 403–4.
12This most recent evolution in the history of psychiatry has also been explored by historians such as Mark
Micale and Edward Shorter. While Shorter’s emphasis on how psychoanalysis declined into a ‘dinosaur
ideolog[y]’ in the wake of biological psychiatry’s ‘smashing success’ contains a strong element of possibly
short-sighted progressivism, Micale’s more nuanced exploration of the ‘mind–body paradigm’ acknowl-
edges instead how psychiatric understanding is subject to ‘powerful social, cultural, and professional
determinants’. Shorter 1997, pp. vii, 305–13; Micale in Cooter and Pickstone (eds) 2000, pp. 336–45.
13Among the more recent chips in the armour of biological psychiatry have been ongoing concerns about
not only the safety of anti-depressant drugs, but the efﬁcacy of such medication. For example, Kirsch
et al. 2008.
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Biologicalpsychiatry’s dominanceoftheprofession todaybeliestheinterdisciplinarycompe-
tition that raged during the 1960s between it, social psychiatry and psychoanalysis. If Pre-
sidentKennedy’s1963MessagetotheUnitedStatesCongressonMentalIllnessandMental
Retardation is any indication, social psychiatry, not biological psychiatry, seemed poised to
challengepsychoanalysisforthehegemonyitenjoyedduringthepost-warperiod.Kennedy’s
emphasis on eliminating the environmental causes of mental illness, especially poverty, mir-
roredthepreventivestrategiesofsocialpsychiatry.
14Healsostressedlessrelianceonmassive,
isolated state hospitals, a system he called ‘social quarantine’, and, instead, a shift towards
the more numerous, smaller and localised communitymental health centres that social psy-
chiatry promoted.
15 Following Kennedy’s assassination by Lee Harvey Oswald in late 1963,
Congress passed the Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act (nicknamed the
‘Oswald Bill’, because of the belief that the Act might have prevented Oswald’s actions),
which helped to realise some of the President’s ambitions.
16 While biological psychiatrists
and psychoanalysts facilitated this move, by providing drugs that allowed institutionalised
patients to move back into their communities with the added provision of counselling, the
new community focus rested on the foundations of social psychiatry.
The theory behind social psychiatry in the 1960s was that mental illness was caused
primarily by socio-economic factors and, therefore, could be prevented by alleviating
poverty, overcrowding, crime and substance abuse.
17 Despite this seemingly radical
premise, such prophylactic strategies reﬂected the beliefs of many psychiatrists during
the 1960s and, indeed, the ofﬁcial policy of the American Psychiatric Association
(APA), especially with respect to children and adolescents.
18 Presidents of the APA
during the 1960s supported the tenets of social psychiatry and urged their colleagues
to study the pathological effects of social problems.
19 Taken in the context of the
1960s, in the midst of the Civil Rights movement, protests against the Vietnam War
and the New Frontier and Great Society social policy initiatives of Presidents Kennedy
and Johnson, it is understandable that many psychiatrists would be interested in the pre-
ventative concepts of social psychiatry.
Furthermore, by the 1960s, research indicated that preventive social strategies could
help to explain and address hyperactivity in children. Researchers such as Gardner,
Malone and Grootenboer found that children brought up in poverty and exposed to
vices such as petty crime, prostitution and violence were much more likely to be hyper-
active, impulsive and distractible in school and succumb to mental illness later on in
life.
20 Chess and her colleagues also claimed that environmental factors could cause
childhood behavioural disorders like hyperactivity.
21 Research suggested that
14Kennedy 1963/1964, pp. 734–5.
15Kennedy 1963/1964, pp. 730–2.
16Bernstein 1991, p. 243.
17Solnit 1966, pp. 7–8.
18Conley et al. 1967/1968, p. 761; Stickney 1967/1968, pp. 1407–9; APA 1968/1969, 1197–1203.
19Ewalt 1959/1960, p. 980; Branch 1963/1964, p. 10; Blain 1965/1966, p. 4; Brosin 1968/1969, p. 7;
Waggoner Sr. 1970/1971, p. 1.
20Grootenboer 1962/1963, p. 471; Malone 1963, pp. 22–3; Gardner 1971/1972, p. 446.
21Chess et al. 1963/1964, p. 147.
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alised visible minorities.
22 For many, such as Spiegel and Brosin, it was the psychiatrist’s
duty to get politically involved and ﬁght to eliminate such pathogenic conditions.
23 Psy-
chiatrists should advocate public housing projects, improved schools and employment
programmes in order to prevent mental illness among society’s disadvantaged.
24 The
social psychiatrist’s role was often as political as it was medical.
25
Moreover, the Joint Commission on the Mental Health of Children (JCMHC), a task force
created following the passage of the Oswald Bill, emphasised that eliminating the socio-
economic hardships faced by children was a key factor in preventing mental illness.
26 Regi-
naldS.Lourie,whoheadedtheJCMHC,waswillingto‘recommendaradicalreconstruction
of the present system’ in order to solve the mental health problems of children.
27 The APA
agreed, saying that the recommendations of the JCMHC would ‘strengthen the nation’s
resolveandcapacitytodealwithitsawesomeproblems’.
28JosephD.Noshpitz,anassociate
editorfortheJournaloftheAmericanAcademyofChildPsychiatry(JAACP),echoedtheAPA’s
plea to American national interests bycontending that the mental health of children should
be the government’s primary commitment.
29 Even outside observers like Judge David
L. Bazelon, who served on the JCMHC, concurred that the mental health needs of children
were best served by providing healthy homes and improved schools.
30
Some biological psychiatrists also acknowledged that social psychiatry had an import-
ant role. Leon Eisenberg, for example, strongly supported social psychiatry’s principles,
despite also being largely responsible for encouraging pharmaceutical research into
hyperactivity.
31 His research on stimulants at Johns Hopkins University during the
mid-1960s, generously supported by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH),
yielded positive results and proved, along with the work by Conners at Harvard, to be
a catalyst for a tremendous amount of subsequent research.
32 Despite this research,
Eisenberg also believed that ‘[t]he severe and chronic deprivation experienced by the pre-
delinquent child can only be dealt with by large scale forceful community efforts’.
33
22Chess et al. 1967, p. 330; Berlin in Berlin and Szurek (eds) 1965, p. 66.
23Brosin 1967/1968, p. 7; Spiegel 1968/1969.
24Solnit 1966, p. 8.
25Duhl 1966/1967, pp. 710–11.
26APA 1968/1969, pp. 1197–203.
27Lourie 1965/1966, p. 1280.
28APA 1968/1969.
29Noshpitz 1974, p. 390.
30Bazelon 1974, p. 199.
31It might be argued that Eisenberg is an atypical biological psychiatrist, especially when his later career is
considered. He served, for instance, as chair of Harvard Medical School’s Department of Social Medicine
and Health Policy and worked towards founding other such departments. Moreover, in his foreword to a
recent volume on the history of paediatrics, he decried the fact that medical students only know socially
active physicians such as Rudolf Virchow and Abraham Jacobi for their medical contributions and not
their ideas about the social causes of illness. Nevertheless, Eisenberg’s pioneering work on stimulant
drugs and hyperactivity indicates that while he might not be representative of biological psychiatry, he
certainly contributed to the neurological theory of hyperactivity. Eisenberg in Stern and Markel (eds)
2002, pp. xiii–xvi.
32Schrag and Divoky 1981, p. 103.
33Goldstein and Eisenberg 1964/1965, pp. 655–6.
Hyperactivity and the Evolution of American Psychiatry, 1957–80 545Eisenberg was also concerned that he and other psychiatrists had ‘neglected prevention
in our preoccupation with treatment’,
34 a view that reﬂected Kennedy’s agenda.
35 With
regard to hyperactivity speciﬁcally, he stressed that ‘[m]uch of the difﬁcult behaviour seen
in association with brain damage syndrome [a 1960s term for hyperactivity] stems not
from the anatomical deﬁcits, but from the social consequences of personality develop-
ment’.
36 Finally, in a symposium with other prominent psychiatrists on whether they
had a role in pushing for social change, Eisenberg urged that they could and should be
a powerful lobby that addressed a variety of social problems.
37
Similarly, many psychoanalysts believed that the anxieties associated with poverty
made children more susceptible to ego dysfunction and subsequent problems like hyper-
activity.
38 Psychoanalyst Eleanor Pavenstedt, the inaugural editor for JAACP, stressed the
need for more research on the psychological effects of poverty, substance abuse, prosti-
tution, violence and crime.
39 Likewise, Malone stated that ‘disorganized’ family situations
characterised by brutality, alcoholism, illegitimacy, crime, delinquency and neglect led to
‘acting out’, a psychoanalytic term for hyperactivity. Malone believed that in the ‘norm-
less world’ impulses like petty crime, prostitution, public urination and ﬁghting were not
fantasised by children, but actually carried out.
40
Psychiatry’s interest in social problems, however, was not a mere reﬂection of contem-
porary political sentiment. Instead, social psychiatric theory, while it reﬂected many of the
socially progressive ideals of the 1960s, was also based on utilitarian aims. Indeed,
Kennedy’s message to Congress stated that his arguments for preventive psychiatry
were based on both compassion and utility.
41 Moreover, as psychiatrists, politicians
and the American public grew increasingly alarmed about the increasing numbers of
mentally troubled children, it became clear that psychotherapy could not be the only sol-
ution.
42 Psychotherapy was popular as a vocation for psychiatrists and as a treatment
with patients, but it was also expensive, emotionally-invasive and time-consuming, and
there were not enough psychotherapists to treat the millions of American children
believed to be in need of therapy.
43 Of the ‘extraordinary numbers of emotionally dis-
turbed children in the country ...the vast majority of children currently needing clinical
care [did] not receive it’.
44 In poorer communities, as the ‘Medical News’ column of the
Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) suggested in 1969, 30 per cent of
children required psychiatric help.
45 Regardless, many psychiatrists argued that even if
there were enough psychoanalysts, the efﬁcacy of psychotherapy had not been
34Eisenberg 1966, p. 23.
35Kennedy 1963/1964, p. 730.
36Eisenberg quoted in Schrager et al. 1966, p. 530.
37Philips et al. 1971/1972, p. 684.
38Berlin in Berlin and Szurek (eds) 1965, pp. 65–6.
39Pavenstedt 1962, pp. 7–8, 1971, pp. 101–5.
40Malone 1963, pp. 22–3.
41Kennedy 1963/1964, p. 737.
42Cunningham 1964, pp. 9–12; Berlin in Berlin and Szurek (eds) 1965, p. 64; Hersch 1971, p. 411.
43Solnit 1966, p. 4.
44Hersch 1971, p. 411.
45Anonymous 1969, p. 356.
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46 As a result, parents seeking psychiatric services for their children were
stymied by long waiting lists and uncertain results when they ﬁnally reached the front
of the queue. Preventing disorders such as hyperactivity, therefore, was thought to be
crucial in order to stem the perceived increases in childhood mental illness.
Despite strong support for social psychiatry, its approach to preventing hyperactivity
was ambitious, idealistic and revolutionary, requiring an enormous amount of political,
social and economic change at all levels of government and society. Unfortunately, as
Solnit noted, politicians, not psychiatrists, had the power to prevent the environmental
causes of mental illness.
47 Reﬂecting on how contemporary psychiatrists felt about
social psychiatry, Solnit (quoting poet Robert Lowell) admitted that ‘[o]ne side of me is
a conventional liberal, concerned with causes, agitated with peace and justice, and equal-
ity. ...My other side is deeply conservative, wanting to get at the root of things’.
48 In
other words, while many psychiatrists believed that the improvement of social conditions
was an efﬁcacious psychiatric strategy, most were unwilling to commit as fully to social
psychiatry’s prescriptions as the discipline demanded. Indeed, many rejected the notion
that psychiatrists should get involved in politics altogether.
49 Others feared that social
psychiatry’s stress on socio-economic conditions, not to mention its endorsement of
cooperation between psychiatry and other allied health professions, would damage psy-
chiatry’s always tenuous reputation and status as a legitimate medical profession.
50
Moreover, as the revolutionary atmosphere of the 1960s began to wane, so too did
enthusiasm for social psychiatry, even amongst its enthusiasts. Indicative of this trend
was Brosin’s ‘Presidential Address’ to the APA in 1968/1969. In his ‘Response to the Pre-
sidential Address’ the previous year, Brosin enthused that the prospects of reducing
poverty and improving health and education looked promising.
51 A year later, Brosin’s
comments were much more cautious. He noted that American involvement in Vietnam
was drawing resources away from mental health programmes and that difﬁcult
choices must be made regarding the direction of American psychiatry’s focus.
52
Quoting John W. Gardner, the Secretary of State for Health, Education, and Welfare,
Brosin indicated that a ‘crunch between expectations and resources’ was occurring,
especially with regards to ‘early childhood education, work with handicapped children,
[and] special education for the disadvantaged’.
53 Resources notwithstanding, other com-
mentators were growing disillusioned with the reforms of the 1960s generally. In an
oddly alliterative, yet apparently serious critique of social psychiatry’s faith in human
nature, psychoanalyst Charles Hersch argued that ‘[t]he community control concept
has been presented as the panacea for the present plight of the poor. But in its practice
the poverty population persistently portrays the same proclivities towards power politics
46Cole et al. 1961/1962, p. 1004.
47Solnit 1966, p. 7.
48Solnit 1966, p. 2.
49Markey 1963, p. 375; Eisendrath 1966/1967, p. 708; Nufﬁeld 1968, pp. 217–21; Philips et al. 1971/
1972, pp. 680–4.
50Bartemeir 1959/1960, p. 978.
51Brosin 1967/1968, p. 7.
52Brosin 1968/1969, p. 5.
53Gardner in Brosin 1968/1969, p. 5.
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social psychiatry’s stress on alleviating poverty was simplistic, naı ¨ve and unlikely to prevent
mental illness.
54
Despite the endorsement of social psychiatry by President Kennedy and many high
proﬁle psychiatrists, the impracticality of its complex and revolutionary remedy for hyper-
activity impeded it from becoming a viable alternative. While social psychiatry’s expla-
nations for hyperactivity were plausible to many, its preventive socio-economic
remedies were nearly impossible to employ, difﬁcult to substantiate through scientiﬁc
trials and unlikely to satisfy those seeking an immediate solution, namely children with
hyperactivity, their families and their psychiatrists. Its theories about preventing mental
illness faded from the pages of the major psychiatric journals by the late 1970s and
have not since re-emerged as a force within the profession. With the demise of social psy-
chiatry, American psychiatry lost its major proponent of preventive, proactive psychiatry
and, instead, reactive strategies became the primary way in which psychiatry dealt with
hyperactivity and other disorders.
Psychoanalytic Psychiatry
If social psychiatry had the most to gain from Kennedy’s interest in mental illness, then
psychoanalysis had the most to lose. During the 1950s and 1960s, psychoanalysis held
the premier position in American psychiatry. The following quotation illustrates the inﬂu-
ence of psychoanalysis during the 1960s, but also the fact that its inﬂuence was begin-
ning to be questioned. The writer, psychiatrist Mark A. Stewart, was annoyed that jobs
advertised in the APA’s ‘Mail Pouch’ required a psychoanalytic orientation, and stated
that ‘[t]his phenomenon, which unhappily is symptomatic of the general situation of psy-
chiatry today, can make our profession seem ridiculous to other physicians and to scien-
tists in general’.
55
Unfortunately for Stewart, however, most psychiatrists during this period were psycho-
analytically trained and descriptive psychoanalytic case studies dominated the pages of
journals. This was especially true of child psychiatrists. Psychoanalytic research eclipsed
that of other psychiatric ﬁelds in JAACP, whose editorial staff during the 1960s consisted
primarily of psychoanalysts. In a special series on ‘acting out’, for example, all articles
were based in psychoanalytic theory, including those by Eveoleen Rexford, the series
editor.
56 Psychoanalytic explanations for hyperactivity were also found in DSM-II.
57 For
many psychiatrists, there was no ‘magical belief in some kind of correspondence
between psychical processes and central nervous processes’.
58 Nevertheless, the
‘wholly new approach’ to psychiatry espoused by President Kennedy, which focused
on social and biological psychiatry, threatened psychoanalysis.
59 Although psychoanalysts
54Hersch 1971, pp. 413–16.
55Stewart 1960/1961, p. 85.
56Rexford 1963, p. 6.
57Jenkins 1968/1969, pp. 1032–3.
58Lofgren 1959/1960, pp. 83–4.
59Council of the American Psychiatric Academy 1963/1964, unnumbered addendum between pp. 728
and 729.
548 Matthew Smithwould indubitably have a part to play, the amount of power they would have to share
with the other ﬁelds was unclear.
If the story of social psychiatry represents how a novel approach proved to be too
radical a solution for American psychiatry, the decline of psychoanalysis in the 1970s
demonstrates the failure of the status quo. While social psychiatry promised one socio-
economic cure for hyperactivity, psychoanalytic theory limited its adherents to address
the disorder one case at a time. In the words of an anonymous letter-writer to the
American Journal of Psychiatry (AJP) in response to social psychiatric theory, ‘[i]ndividual
psychotherapy is the only treatment that roots out the trouble. You can’t apply this on a
mass basis’.
60 The aetiologies of mental illness, while rooted in Freudian theory, were as
numerous as the number of patients. It was the vicissitudes of human development that
led to unresolved psychic conﬂict, not the inequities of a Dickensian social structure. The
roots of hyperactivity werenot found on the overcrowded and violent streets of the urban
slums, but were mired in the core of the patient’s unconscious. And in order to tap into
the unconscious of a hyperactive child, thorough investigation and individual psychother-
apy was required.
The psychoanalytic approach to hyperactivity helps to explain why the discipline failed
to remain the most authoritative, legitimate and relevant branch of psychiatry during the
1970s. In particular, it illuminates the most pressing conundrum for psychoanalysts;
namely, the difﬁculty in bridging the gap between theory and practice. While psychoana-
lysts provided many rational explanations for hyperactive behaviour, it was more difﬁcult
for them to treat the disorder effectively. The psychotherapeutic process required a
patient to concentrate, be reﬂective and follow dutifully the psychotherapist’s sugges-
tions. Understandably, these were arduous requirements for hyperactive children. One
psychoanalyst described that her patient’s ‘hyperactivity increased and all in a manner
of a few minutes, she sat on my desk, wrote on the blackboard, and picked her nose
excessively’.
61 In a market saturated with potential patients, many psychiatrists
accused psychoanalysts of turning away hyperactive children.
62 Moreover, very few
families could afford the time or money required for psychoanalysis.
63 As Eisenberg
explained, there were ‘more people struggling in the stream of life than we can rescue
with our present tactics [of psychoanalysis]’.
64
Regardless of the difﬁculties inherent in treating hyperactive patients, many psycho-
analysts researched the disorder. Although superego dysfunction was cited as a
general cause, understanding the speciﬁc reasons for why it existed in each case was
required in order for effective psychotherapeutic treatment. As a result, most of the
psychoanalytic articles found in psychiatric journals during the 1960s about hyperactivity
were written in the form of case studies featuring the clinical observations of a single
patient. The patient would be introduced along with a detailed description of his or
60Anonymous in Davidson 1963/1964, p. 192.
61Kernberg 1969, p. 537.
62Eisenberg et al. 1959/1960, p. 1092; Berman 1964, p. 24; Kal 1968/1969, p. 1128; Rapoport et al. 1971,
p. 531.
63Rexford 1962, p. 381.
64Eisenberg 1966, p. 23.
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how he/she was able to unravel the reasons for the patient’s hyperactivity and describe
the course of psychotherapy. One instance of this is found in the 1960 edition of the
Archives of General Psychiatry in which the story of ‘Jean’ was told. Jean was a 12
year-old girl whose impulsive behaviour, her psychiatrist determined, was the result of
penis envy stemming from the relationship she had with her father. Jean’s impulsivity
ceased only when she was able to come to terms with this explanation.
65 The root
causes of hyperactivity in other children could also originate in the child’s weaning,
toilet training or adjustment to a new sibling.
66
Despite speciﬁc aetiological differences, psychoanalytic theories about hyperactivity
shared two important commonalities that affected how the rest of the psychiatric com-
munity received such theories. First, psychoanalysts stressed the uniqueness of each
patient and his/her speciﬁc course of therapy.
67 Psychoanalysts who treated hyperactiv-
ity promised no magic bullets, in marked contrast to both social and biological psychia-
trists. Therefore, it required both a great deal of faith in its efﬁcacy and a substantial
degree of patience on the part of both the psychoanalyst and his or her patient.
Secondly, psychoanalysts described hyperactivity as being a psychological, as opposed
to a neurological, phenomenon. Superego impairment caused a child’s id to dominate
the ego, leading to the impulsive behaviours characterised by hyperactivity. Psycho-
analysis was the only way to free the ego from the unwanted oppression exerted
by the uncontrolled id.
68 Even when the role of neurology in mental illness was
beginning to be emphasised, psychoanalysts insisted that understanding the uncon-
scious was more important. For example, Rogers suggested to his fellow psychoanalysts
that the calming and motivating effects of ritalin might lead to more efﬁcient
psychotherapy.
69
While these two axioms helped psychoanalysts understand hyperactivity, they were
also the means by which biological psychiatrists were able to challenge and discredit
their approach to hyperactivity and replace it with their own. First, the psychoanalytic
insistence on pinpointing the aetiological explanations for hyperactivity in each patient
was seen by biological psychiatrists as excessive, perhaps even contravening their role
as a healer, since it supplanted the provision of pharmaceuticals.
70 Furthermore, some
psychiatrists believed that not only was psychotherapy for hyperactivity ‘fruitless and frus-
trating’, when ‘misdirected ... it [could] be every bit as dangerous as misdirected
surgery’.
71
The psychoanalytic belief that hyperactivity was a mental phenomenon also alienated
the ﬁeld from mainstream medicine and, for many psychiatrists, undermined the
65Weinreb and Counts 1960, pp. 549–50.
66Thomas et al. 1959/1960, p. 798.
67Rexford 1963, pp. 6, 9–17; Reiser 1963, pp. 53, 67; Heinicke and Strassman 1975, p. 569.
68Rexford 1963, pp. 6–9; Schrager et al. 1966, p. 529; Leventhal 1968.
69Rogers 1960/1961, p. 549. Some biological psychiatrists also stressed that pharmacotherapy was merely
a means to the end of improved counselling sessions. Smith 1964/1965, p. 703.
70Cole et al. 1961/1962, p. 1004; Sargant 1964/1965, p. xxviii; Eisenberg 1966, p. 19; Rapoport et al.
1971, p. 524.
71Levy 1971, p. 1865.
550 Matthew Smithdiscipline’s scientiﬁc legitimacy.
72 This deﬁed American psychiatrists’ long-standing desire
to be perceived as members of a legitimate and authoritative medical profession.
73 Eisen-
berg, for example, suggested that if psychoanalysis was to be employed by any mental
health professionals, it should be social workers and psychologists, not psychiatrists.
74
Moreover, the popularity of anti-psychotics like thorazine and anti-depressants like
miltown rekindled the idea that psychiatric magic bullets could exist and ritalin seemed
to be a suitable candidate for hyperactivity. Pharmaceutical companies fuelled these
beliefs by increasingly advertising in medical journals and courting psychiatrists to pre-
scribe their products.
By the 1970s, psychoanalysis seemed anachronistic in an American society that consist-
ently looked to technology to solve its problems. No longer was there to be a ‘twisted
thought without a twisted molecule’.
75 For American psychiatry, psychoanalysis could
not logistically address the alarming pandemic of hyperactivity and it ignored develop-
ments in neurology and pharmacology. It also appeared to be an approach that
championed theoretical understanding over efﬁcacious patient treatment. In sum,
psychoanalytical treatment of hyperactivity proved to be unattractive for both patients
and psychiatrists and with its demise, the biological explanation for the disorder
remained.
Biological Psychiatry
Among psychiatrists, those who looked to neurological explanations for mental illness
had the longest history of investigating hyperactivity, but this does not explain why the
biological psychiatry that emerged in the post-war period was able to dominate research
into the disorder by 1980. A handful of psychiatrists had investigated symptoms resem-
bling hyperactivity since the early twentieth century, but up until 1957, such research was
sporadic, consisting of a few articles per decade, and often concentrated on small sample
populations of institutionalised children. When hyperactivity emerged as a major problem
in the 1960s, psychoanalytical explanations for the disorder dominated and social psy-
chiatric theories also commanded attention. The failure of these approaches, in the
late 1960s and early 1970s, to deal with hyperactivity in an expedient, efﬁcient and inex-
pensive manner was paramount in allowing biological explanations and treatments to
dominate by the mid-1970s. Notwithstanding this factor, others also played a role in but-
tressing biological explanations for hyperactivity during the period. These included the
quick, inexpensive and seemingly efﬁcacious stimulant treatment biological psychiatrists
offered and the cautiously optimistic attitude biological psychiatrists adopted when pre-
senting hyperactivity research.
In contrast to psychotherapy or radical social change, the pharmaceutical treatment of
hyperactivity was remarkably inexpensive, quick and simple. Parents, frustrated by other
forms of treatment, found ritalin an easy and immediate alternative. Its efﬁcacy was
72Kahn 1960/1961, p. 755; Marmor 1968/1969, p. 679.
73American psychiatry’s struggle for legitimacy has been well documented by Gerald Grob. Grob 1991,
pp. 51, 279.
74Eisenberg 1966, p. 20.
75Langdell 1967, p. 166.
Hyperactivity and the Evolution of American Psychiatry, 1957–80 551demonstrated in dozens of studies and many psychiatrists were so convinced that it
worked that they used it as a clinical diagnostic tool; if the child in their ofﬁce responded
to ritalin, then he/she was hyperactive.
76 Conﬁdence in ritalin reﬂected a larger trend in
psychiatry towards pharmacotherapy and, by the late 1960s, pharmacotherapy had
become increasingly common and actively marketed.
77 A quick look through the
pages of JAMA during the 1960s and 1970s also indicates that the marketing of psy-
choactive drugs was not only widespread, but aggressive, featuring creative, full-page
advertisements that graphically depicted the horrors of mental illness and the beneﬁts
of drugs.
78
It would be a mistake, however, to believe that ritalin was the wonder drug the adver-
tisements portrayed. The effects of ritalin were nearly instantaneous, but the drug did not
cure nor prevent hyperactivity; it only controlled symptoms temporarily. Stimulants
worked for only 80 per cent of patients and their effectiveness faded with time, requiring
increasingly larger doses.
79 With millions of diagnosed children, 20 per cent amounted to
a substantial population of untreated patients. Biological psychiatrists also had a great
deal of difﬁculty explaining the perplexing paradox of why stimulants calmed hyperactive
children.
80 They also often ignored or downplayed the side-effects associated with ritalin,
including growth inhibition, irritability, insomnia, anorexia, heart palpitations and halluci-
nations.
81 The strong sales of ritalin from the mid-1960s to the present day indicate that
psychiatrists, as well as parents, were willing to accept these shortcomings, chieﬂy
because stimulants did what psychotherapy could not do: they calmed hyperactive chil-
dren down in a matter of minutes.
82
Another reason such side-effects might have been tolerated is that biological psychia-
trists were careful to describe their research in a cautiously optimistic fashion that left
room for improvement. Ritalin might not cure hyperactivity and might induce troubling
side effects, but with more research, it was believed that its efﬁcacy would continue to
improve. An example of this somewhat deterministic attitude is found in a 1971 article
entitled ‘Psychopharmacology: The Picture is not Entirely Rosy’ by psychiatrist Joseph
76Millichap 1968, p. 1528.
77By the early 1960s, in fact, some psychiatrists were complaining about the extent to which pharma-
ceutical companies ‘bombarded’ psychiatrists with advertising. Cammer 1961/1962, p. 448.
78One such advertisement from JAMA featured a gaunt, exhausted PhD student whose thesis is described
as being ‘in progress’. The solution to the stress he feels, with which any PhD student would identify, was
a prescription for valium. The message in this advertisement that the stress of intensive study can be alle-
viated with valium was directed both at physicians, who might recall such stress from their student days,
and PhD and MD students who might have cause to read JAMA for their research. Higher learning, as this
advertisement suggested, was a pathological activity. AMA 209 (1969), pp. 609–10.
79Tec 1970/1971, p. 1424.
80Schnackenberg 1973; Silver 1976, p. 253; Werry 1977, p. 452.
81Laufer in Anonymous 1970, p. 2261; Lucas and Weiss 1971; Garﬁnkel et al. 1975, p. 723; Firestone et al.
1978, p. 446. One reason for ritalin’s popularity was that its side-effects, though serious, paled in com-
parison to that of amphetamines, anti-depressants and tranquilisers. Zrull et al. 1964/1965. This notwith-
standing, some psychiatrists also suggested that ritalin’s growth inhibitory effect was so serious that the
prescription of growth hormones to hyperactive children taking the drug was warranted. Puig-Antich
et al. 1978, p. 457.
82In 1971, for example, ritalin made $13 million for CIBA, amounting to 15 per cent of its proﬁts. Conrad
1976, p. 15.
552 Matthew SmithO. Cole. Despite its ostensibly pessimistic theme, the article actually demonstrated
conﬁdence in the future of psychopharmacology. Cole suggested that while there was
plenty of work yet to be done, psychiatric ambitions of miracle pills would be realised
eventually.
83 Nevertheless, Cole stressed that the only way to achieve these goals was
by conducting persistent research and not getting discouraged by setbacks or the
criticisms of otherwise-inclined psychiatrists. The underlying theme of Cole’s article is
that biological psychiatry, while not quite able to provide miraculous cures, was on the
right path and would do so eventually. In order to reinforce this notion, a great many
articles presenting stimulant research traced the history of such research back to Bradley’s
original work in 1937. This strategy conveyed to readers a false sense of the history of
hyperactivity, since very few articles were written on hyperactivity between 1937 and
1957, but also implied that research into stimulant treatment was always progressing
and improving.
Such researchers, however, were also careful to reinforce the idea that their work on
hyperactivity, though progressing, was not yet conclusive. When Camilla Anderson’s
Society Pays: The High Cost of Minimal Brain Damage in America was published in
1973 (minimal brain damage being an earlier term for hyperactivity), prominent hyper-
activity researcher and biological psychiatrist Paul Wender gave it a negative review.
His criticisms did not focus on the stark eugenic message in Anderson’s book, but
rather on its lack of evidence, overly bold statements about the genetic and neurological
basis of minimal brain damage and Anderson’s rejection of any possibility that hyperac-
tivity could be affected by environmental factors.
84
As the 1970s wore on, however, biological psychiatrists grew somewhat more optimis-
tic, and less cautious. Increasingly, biological psychiatrists stressed that their approach to
hyperactivity was the most scientiﬁc and, thus, gave psychiatry the medical and scientiﬁc
status they had lost when psychoanalysis had been dominant. Gone from the psychiatry
journals were the descriptive case studies that characterised the psychoanalytic clinical
research of hyperactivity. In their place were the laconic accounts of double-blind trials
that tested the efﬁcacy of particular drugs for the disorder. By the late 1970s, it was
becoming clear that psychoanalytic explanations for hyperactivity, and other mental ill-
nesses, would be left out of DSM-III, to be published in 1980.
85 Indeed, socially-oriented
psychiatrists Rutter and Shaffer noted, rather gloomily, that DSM-III would be a scientiﬁc
coming of age for psychiatry.
86 Biological psychiatrists like Werry, in contrast, enthused
that DSM-III meant that psychiatrists could once again take their place amongst scien-
tists.
87 But did psychiatry’s embracing of neurology really mean that the profession had
ﬁnally earned its place in the medical establishment? Ironically, when American psychiatry
determined that hyperactivity was a neurological disorder, it opened the door for other
mental health professionals, such as neuro-psychologists, to test for and diagnose the
83Cole 1971, p. 225.
84Although not mentioned explicitly, Wender might have also been annoyed that Anderson stressed the
genetic aetiology of hyperactivity, but used the term minimal brain ‘damage’, a term that implied
brain injury as the primary cause of the condition. Anderson 1972; Wender 1973.
85Cantwell et al. 1979, p. 452; Spitzer and Cantwell 1979, p. 363.
86Rutter and Shafer 1979, p. 372.
87Werry 1982, p. 3.
Hyperactivity and the Evolution of American Psychiatry, 1957–80 553condition. These professionals could not prescribe drugs to treat hyperactivity, but neither
were they forced to refer their clients to a psychiatrist for a prescription; a general prac-
titioner or paediatrician could sufﬁce as well.
Conclusion
This history of hyperactivity and American psychiatry has attempted to demonstrate that
hyperactivity’s emergence as a neurological, pharmaceutically-treated condition was not
as simple as previous accounts have inferred, but rather the result of a spirited debate
between rival ﬁelds within American psychiatry. More questions remain, however, regard-
ing how hyperactivity became the most common childhood mental illness of the late
twentieth century. These include why hyperactive behaviour, especially in academic set-
tings, became pathologised during the post-war period, the role of the pharmaceutical
industry in the disorder’s spread and the disorder’s particular prominence in North
America. The work of Healy, Rose and others on not only the proliferation of psychophar-
maceuticals, but also the parallel growth in the rates of psychiatric illness, can provide sig-
niﬁcant insight into these issues.
88 As in this study, further research into hyperactivity’s
history will likely reveal as much about psychiatry and the society in which it operates,
as it does about the disorder itself.
In 1964, Robert H. Felix, the ﬁrst director of the NIMH, wrote an article for AJP entitled
‘The Image of the Psychiatrist: Past, Present, and Future’. He described an American psy-
chiatric profession that had fought for a generation, since the 1930s, for recognition and
respect from the medical community. He decried the divisiveness between neurologically
and psychologically-oriented psychiatrists and saw an opportunity for a ‘warm, human
[and] down to earth’ psychiatric profession that would be ‘civilly active’, ‘serve the com-
munity’ and have both psychological and biological grounding.
89 In the 1960s, this vision
of a holistic, complementary and comprehensive psychiatry, also espoused by President
Kennedy, was a possibility, but by the 1970s, as the history of hyperactivity suggests,
this vision never materialised. Social, psychoanalytic and biological psychiatrists research-
ing and treating hyperactive children criticised one another’s understandings of hyper-
activity and competed to develop authoritative explanations and treatments for the
disorder. Biological psychiatrists achieved success in these debates not because their
approach was more scientiﬁc, but rather because it was more practical, efﬁcient, inex-
pensive and, in some ways, more cautious, than that of its rivals. As social and psycho-
analytic theories of hyperactivity were cast aside, notions of its social and emotional
complexity were also abandoned.
The reluctance of psychiatry to evolve into a more complex, multi-dimensional ﬁeld is
reﬂected in prominent child psychiatrist Justin Call’s thoughts in 1976 about how hyper-
activity itself exempliﬁed the desire for simplicity in psychiatry. Call mused that the ‘label
of hyperactivity owes its popularity to the soothing effect such simple conceptions have
upon issues of great cognitive complexity. Such labels ...bring cognitive comfort’.
90 A
similar statement might be made about American psychiatry during the 1960s and
88Healy 2003; Rose 2007.
89Felix 1964/1965.
90Call 1976, p. 156.
554 Matthew Smith1970s in general. The biological psychiatric theory of hyperactivity that evolved during
this period was certainly simpler, but that did not make it more satisfactory. It is likely
that if Felix’s vision had been realised, a more sophisticated and constructive understand-
ing of hyperactivity would have emerged.
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